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Received wisdom and beyond: 
Lessons from fiscal consolidations in the EU 
 
Martin Larch and Alessandro Turrini (1) 
European Commission, 
Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines consolidation episodes in the EU since 1970 with a view to shedding light on the 
factors that determine the success or failure of fiscal adjustment. Compared to the existing literature on 
successful fiscal consolidations we add a number of new dimensions. Three deserve particular attention. 
Firstly, we explore a broader set of potential ingredients of the recipe for success. In addition to the 
composition of adjustment, which has extensively been examined in the literature, we consider further 
elements such as the quality and strength of fiscal governance and the implementation of structural 
reforms. Secondly, our analysis seeks to differentiate between at least two different types of consolidation 
episodes, one in which a relatively big fiscal correction is implemented in a short period of time, dubbed 
'cold shower' consolidation, as compared to more gradual episodes of adjustment. Thirdly, we check 
whether the 'recipe for success' changed over time. Our analysis broadly confirms the results established in 
the literature for what concerns (i) the conditions triggering a consolidation episode and (ii) the 
composition of adjustment, with minor but important qualifications related to the role played by 
government wages. In addition it provides evidence that well-designed fiscal governance as well as 
structural reforms improve the odds of both starting a consolidation episode and achieving a lasting fiscal 
correction. Our analysis also shows that the composition of successful and unsuccessful consolidation has 
become more similar over time and that other discriminating factors such as fiscal governance and 
structural reforms turn out to make an increasing difference for success. 
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1. Introduction 
In the run-up to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) some Member States have 
implemented impressive fiscal retrenchments and today public finances in the EU are, overall, in 
a better shape as compared to the early 1990s. However, the scope for fiscal consolidation has not 
vanished. In recent years, a large number of EU countries, both 'old' and recently acceded 
Member States, faced the challenge to restore or achieve budgetary discipline. Governments 
responded with different cures that were implemented under diverse economic and institutional 
circumstances and gave rise to a varying degree of success. 
This paper examines fiscal consolidations in the EU since 1970 with a view to shedding light on 
the factors that determine the success or failure of consolidation. Following common practice in 
the literature the notion of success used in our analysis refers to a more lasting as opposed to a 
merely short-lived correction of the budgetary position.  
Compared to the existing literature on successful fiscal consolidation we add a number of new 
dimensions. First of all, we explore a broader set of ingredients that may determine the recipe for 
success. In addition to the composition of adjustment, which has extensively been examined in 
the literature, we consider further elements such as the quality and strength of fiscal governance 
and the implementation of structural reforms. Secondly, our analysis seeks to differentiate 
between at least two different types of consolidation episodes, one in which a relatively big fiscal 
correction is implemented in a short period of time, dubbed 'cold shower' consolidation, as 
compared to more gradual episodes of adjustment. Such a differentiation is motivated by the 
conjecture that the recipe for success may be conditional on the type of adjustment chosen. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 prepares the ground for the empirical analysis of 
fiscal consolidations in the EU. It starts with the definitions of both fiscal consolidation and 
success used in our analysis. Section 2 also summaries the existing stock of knowledge about the 
factors explaining successful consolidation and presents some basic information about fiscal 
consolidations in the EU. Section 3 explores the elements and conditions that lead to and trigger 
episodes of fiscal adjustment. It also takes a closer look at the circumstances that discriminate 
between a ‘gradual’ as opposed to a ‘cold shower’ consolidation. Section 4 goes a step further 
and examines the odds for success. It focuses on the features and elements of fiscal consolidation 
that on average are likely to give rise to a lasting correction. Section 5 identifies the revenue and 
expenditure categories that rebound after the end of unsuccessful episodes. Section 6 summarizes 
and concludes.  
 
2. Preliminaries: definitions, received wisdom and basic features of 
successful fiscal consolidations  
This section sets the scene for our empirical work. As a first step, it establishes operational 
definitions of what is actually meant by fiscal consolidation and when a consolidation episode is 
thought to be successful. After that, it briefly reviews the main findings of the empirical literature 
on the determinants of successful fiscal consolidation. This review serves as background and 
benchmark for our own analysis. Finally, the section also provides some basic features of the 
fiscal consolidation episodes identified in our data sample.  
Defining episodes of fiscal consolidation 
A definition of successful consolidation involves at least three different elements: (i) a measure 
of fiscal consolidation; (ii) a reference period over which a given size of consolidation is 
implemented; and (iii) a criteria discriminating between success and failure. 
As regards the measure of fiscal consolidation, we use improvements of the cyclically-adjusted 
primary budget balance (CAPB), derived as the difference between the nominal primary balance 
and the cyclical component of the budget. (2) Interest expenditure is excluded because it is 
generally not considered discretionary, unless exceptional measures to reduce debt are taken. 
The most commonly used measure in the literature is an indicator proposed by Blanchard (1990). 
It attempts to isolate discretionary components by calculating the primary budget balance that 
would have prevailed if the rate of unemployment had remained unchanged with respect to the 
previous year. In the 1990s measures of this type were clearly preferred over more complex 
indicators involving potential output estimates such as the CAPB. (3) In the meantime, the CAPB 
has become the main reference for purging the budget of its temporary cyclical components. It is 
used by all major international economic organisations including the IMF and the OECD. The 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance is also the official indicator in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework to capture the budgetary effects of discretionary fiscal policy. (4) 
Possible caveats of both the Blanchard-type of indicator and changes in the CAPB as a measure 
are well known. On top of discretionary fiscal policy measures they can also reflect other 
elements such as one-off and accounting distortions, autonomous revenue fluctuations and 
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(2)  where  is the nominal primary budget balance, 
ttt OGpbcapb ⋅−= ε tpb ε  the sensitivity of the budget with respect to the cycle as measured 
by the output gap . For a detailed discussion of the cyclical-adjustment method used in the EU fiscal framework see European 
Commission (2004). 
tOG
(3) See Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
(4) Initially used as an analytical instrument, the CAB was established as a key instrument of budgetary surveillance under the SGP in March 
2003, when the ECOFIN Council adopted conclusions consistent with the recommendations contained in the November 2002 Commission 
Communication ‘Strengthening the co-ordination of budgetary policies’ advocating the use of underlying budget balances. The role of the 
CAB was further strengthened with the reformed Pact in which both the medium-term budgetary objectives and the adjustment towards them 
are expressed in cyclically-adjusted terms. The commonly agreed methodology for estimating potential output and the output gap, which is 
one of the main inputs to the CAB used for EU fiscal surveillance, is explained in detail in Part VI of this report. 
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growth surprises. (5) In our analysis we try to address these measurement issues (i) by choosing 
sufficiently large changes in the CAPB and (ii) by using specific variables that may control for at 
least some of  these  other factors,  notably data  on one-off measures and apparent tax 
elasticities. (6)  
As regards the size and timing of consolidation, we allow for two different types of consolidation 
episodes. The first is characterised by a sharp fiscal adjustment effort concentrated in one single 
year. The second type is one in which the fiscal correction is implemented over a longer period.  
Definition 1 – Consolidation: A consolidation is an improvement of the CAPB of at least 1.5% 
of GDP which is either achieved (i) in one single year or (ii) over a period of three years where in 
each single year the improvement of the CAPB is less than 1.5% of GDP and the CAPB does not 
deteriorate by more than 0.5% of GDP compared to the year before. (7) 
The relatively high threshold of a 1.5% of GDP improvement of the CAPB was chosen for two 
reasons. First and foremost, because of what was just said above about the 'noise' included in 
observed changes in the CAPB. Large adjustments are unlikely to result from other factors than 
discretionary fiscal policy. Second, it is easier to discern differences in the composition of 
adjustment fiscal adjustment if the overall correction is larger. 
Episodes satisfying at least one of the two conditions in Definition 1 are consolidation episodes 
for the purpose of our analysis. Episodes of the first type will be referred to as 'cold shower' 
consolidations, to highlight the relatively strong tightening over a period of one calendar year. 
Episodes of the second type will be called 'gradual consolidations'. It is important to note that the 
two definitions are mutually exclusive but a 'cold shower' adjustment could be adjacent to a 
'gradual' episode. Moreover, the definition of a 'gradual' adjustment formally excludes 
consolidations of more than 4.5 % of GDP over three years. Consolidations of this type are 
treated as successive 'cold shower' episodes.  
The reason for discriminating between those two types of consolidation episodes is 
straightforward. They can be taken to represent polar cases. In a 'cold, shower' adjustment the 
fiscal correction is concentrated in a short period of time and may potentially reflect a completely 
different economic environment as well as different institutional arrangements than a gradual 
consolidation episode. 
Definition 2 - Success: A consolidation in line with Definition 1 is deemed successful if the 
following condition applies: in the three years after the end of the consolidation episode the 
CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.75% of GDP in cumulative terms compared to the 
 
(5)  Koen and Van den Noord (2005) examine the distortions arising from one-off measures and accounting issues. Girouard and Price (2004) 
highlight role of autonomous fluctuation in revenues that are not netted-off when adjusting the budget for the effect of the cycle. Larch and 
Salto (2005) point to the impact of economic growth surprises.  
(6) The impact of autonomous fluctuations on the assessment of fiscal adjustment is described in Section II.2.1 of this report. 
(7)   Most existing studies of fiscal consolidation rely on combined definitions, which like Definition 1 include different combinations of size and 
in particular time of fiscal adjustment. This is the case in Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and von Hagen and al. 
(2002). The obvious advantage of combined definitions is to increase the number of consolidation episodes for the purpose of the econometric 
analysis. 
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level recorded in the last year of the consolidation period. In other words, at least half of the 
overall minimum fiscal correction required to qualify as consolidation has to be safeguarded three 
years after. A consolidation is deemed unsuccessful if this condition is not met.  
This definition departs in one important respect compared to previous work. It is not linked to the 
evolution of the government debt ratio. This was a deliberate choice so as to avoid the clear head 
start of high debt countries to reduce the debt ratio for a given rate of nominal GDP growth, 
which is generally positive except for severe recessions. (8) 
Like for any alternative, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in our definitions of 
consolidation and success. However, abstracting from a number of specificities concerning the 
length and size of fiscal adjustment our definition of consolidation shares one important feature 
with those used in the literature. The focus is on episodes of tight fiscal policy reflecting a 
marked change in the fiscal policy stance. As mentioned before, this ensures that the 
improvements in the CAPB is genuinely discretionary and not due do to other factors.  
Findings from the existing literature 
A fairly rich literature has emerged on the determinants and the economic effects of successful 
fiscal consolidation. In some cases success and economic effects are covered at the same time. In 
this section we review the results concerning the factors that determine the success of fiscal 
consolidation. A synthetic overview is provided in Table 1. 
The first comprehensive empirical analysis of fiscal adjustments is by Alesina and Perotti (1995). 
It focuses on OECD countries and sets the foundations for the by now familiar notion that the 
composition of adjustment is crucial for success. In particular, Alesina and Perotti (1995) find 
that successful adjustments are mainly expenditure based, with a focus on primary current 
expenditure. This result has been replicated and confirmed by a series of later studies (for 
instance Alesina and Perotti, 1997, Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, von Hagen et. al, 2002, Briotti, 
2004, Lambertini and Tavares, 2005) and is by now accepted as received wisdom.  
Part of this received wisdom is also the role played by the labour market channel in making 
expenditure-based consolidations successful. Alesina and Perotti (1997) were among the first to 
point out that the 'right' composition of fiscal adjustment can produce beneficial effects on labour 
cost developments which in turn spur economic activity producing a positive feedback on the 
consolidation effort. 
A further important element of the received wisdom is the impact of initial conditions. Successful 
consolidations are typically triggered by a strained fiscal situation during economic bad times. 
The gravity of fiscal and economic conditions make it easier for fiscal policy makers to launch a 
decisive adjustment programme, as the electorate can be expected to see the need for action. 
 
(8)   In our sample of 634 observations there are only 66 years with negative nominal GDP growth. The mostly refer to recently acceded Member 
States where the debt level is generally low. 
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Table 1: Main determinants of successful fiscal consolidations: A synthetic overview of the evidence from 
previous empirical studies 
Determinants Main findings References 
Composition of fiscal 
adjustment 
Cuts in expenditure are more effective than tax 
increases in making consolidation successful. 
Reductions in public sector employment and wages, 
and in transfers are found to be particularly 
conducive. Thus far, this result represents 
'conventional wisdom'. More recent studies, 
focusing on country cases, provide evidence that 
both expenditure and revenue-based consolidation 
can be successful. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Zaghini (1999), v. Hagen et al. 
(2002), Briotti (2004), 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005), 
Ahrend et al. (2006) Alesina 
and Perotti (1997), Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998) Bertelsmann 
Foundation (2006). 
Size of fiscal 
adjustment 
The size of fiscal adjustment is found to be relevant 
as it may make a consolidation harder to reverse. 
The result is not robust across alternative studies 
and seems to depend on the definition of success. 
Ardagna (2004), v. Hagen et al. 
(2002), Briotti (2004), 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005) 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) 
Zaghini (1999). 
 
Initial conditions 
macroeconomic and 
fiscal conditions 
The gravity of initial macroeconomic and fiscal 
conditions plays a role, especially in triggering an 
episode of consolidation. It is also found to 
influence the success rate of consolidation. 
Ardagna (2004), Zaghini 
(1999), von Hagen et al. 
(2002), Briotti (2004), 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005), 
Ahrend et al. (2006) Alesina 
and Ardagna (1998). 
Monetary stance A number of studies conclude that the monetary 
policy stance is relevant for success as it may 
accommodate consolidation. This conclusion is not 
corroborated in general. 
Ahrend et al. (2006), 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2006) v. Hagen et al. (2002) 
Ardagna (2004), Lambertini 
and Tavares (2005). 
 
Exchange rate Like for the monetary stance, the exchange rate is 
found to matter as it may accommodate 
consolidation. In particular, depreciations increase 
the chances of success.  
 
Alesina and Perotti (1997), 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), 
Lambertini and Tavares (2005). 
Rate of GDP growth The findings concerning economic growth are not 
clear cut. There is evidence that accelerating growth 
benefits the rate of success. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2006) and Ardagna (2004). 
Political factors Single-party governments are generally more 
effective than coalitions, while the political 
alignment hardly matters. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2006). 
 
Apart from fiscal issues, over the years increasing attention has been paid to political factors. An 
early overview of these is presented in Alesina et al. (1998). Single party governments are 
generally found to be more effective for achieving fiscal consolidation than coalitions, while the 
political alignment of governments hardly matters. Potentially painful consolidation measures are 
found to be best implemented during the period soon after an election, when popular support for 
 the government is still running at high levels. The role of political leadership (of the Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister in particular) in promoting fiscal consolidation and the way 
consolidation is communicated to the public is often discerned as relevant too.  
As to monetary conditions and exchange rates, they have also been identified as factors that 
determine the likelihood of success of fiscal consolidations, for instance by Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998) and Lambertini and Tavares (2005). However, the findings are less robust than those 
concerning the composition of adjustment.  
Fiscal consolidations in the EU: basic facts 
Our sample covers all 27 Member States of the EU. The time period depends on the availability 
of the data and is not the same for all countries. For the EU-15 countries the period is generally 
1970-2006. (9) Shorter periods, mostly starting in the mid-1990s, are covered for the recently 
acceded Member States. The exact sample length by country is indicated in Table 2  below. 
Table 2: Overview of episodes of fiscal consolidation in the EU 
Cold-shower
No. of 
years Gradual
No. of 
years
Total No. 
of years Sample period
BE 1977, 1982, 1984, 1993, 2006 5 1985, 1986, 1987, 1996, 1997, 1998 6 11 1971-2006
BG - - 0 2003-2006
CZ 2004 1 - 1 1998-2006
DK 1983, 1984, 1986 3 2003, 2004, 2005 3 6 1971-2006
DE 1982, 1989, 2000 3 1983, 1984, 1985, 1992, 1993, 1994 6 9 1971-2006
EE 2000, 2003 2 - 2 1996-2006
IE 1976,1983, 1988, 2004 4 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 4 8 1971-2006
EL 1974, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2005, 2006 9 - 9 1971-2006
ES 1986, 1992, 1996 3 - 3 1971-2006
FR 1996 1 2004, 2005, 2006 3 4 1971-2006
IT 1976, 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997 7 - 7 1971-2006
CY 2000, 2004, 2005 3 - 3 1999-2006
LV 1996, 2000 2 2003, 2004, 2005 3 5 1996-2006
LT 1998, 1999 2 - 2 1996-2006
LU 1983, 1985, 1993, 1997 4 1994, 1995, 1996 3 7 1983-1987, 1991-2006
HU 1999, 2003 2 2 1998-2006
MT 1999, 2004, 2005 3 2000, 2001, 2002 3 6 1999-2006
NL 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2005 5 1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 7 12 1971-2006
AT 1984, 1996, 1997, 2001 4 - 4 1971-2006
PL 2005 1 - 1 1996-2006
PT 1977, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1992, 2002, 2006 8 - 8 1971-2006
RO 1997, 1998, 1999 3 - 3 1996-2006
SI 2002 1 - 1 2001-2006
SK 1998, 2001, 2003 3 - 3 1997-2006
FI 1976, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1996, 1998, 2000 7 - 7 1971-2006
SE 1971, 1976, 1983, 1987, 1995, 1996 6 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2003, 2004, 2005 9 15 1971-2006
UK 1974, 1980, 1982, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 7 - 7 1971-2006
Total 99 47 146
Type of consolidation
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(9) The EU-15 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
Overall, our dataset contains 634 observations of which 146, close to one fourth, qualify as years 
of consolidation in line with Definition 1. One third of the 146 years of consolidation were 
crowned with success in line with Definition 2.  
Table 2 summarises some basic information by country and, more interestingly, by type of 
consolidation. It shows a clear prevalence of the 'cold shower'-type of adjustment, which 
accounts for around two thirds of the total number of years in which fiscal consolidations have 
taken place. 'Gradual' adjustments are significantly less frequent. The clear prevalence of abrupt 
and sizeable fiscal corrections is evidenced by the frequency distribution of the change in the 
CAPB during years of consolidation displayed in Figure 1. In close to 70% of the years referring 
to a consolidation episode in line with Definition 1 the CAPB improved by 1.5% of GDP or 
more. The high frequency of annual corrections of 3% or more largely reflects the experience of 
the new or recently acceded Member States. With a view to EU accession these countries 
implemented at times impressive fiscal adjustments. Almost 30% of the consolidation years 
recorded for the new Member States gave rise to an annual improvement of the CAPB of 3% of 
GDP or more. 
Figure 1:  Frequency distribution of the annual 
improvement of the cyclically-adjusted  primary 
budget balance (CAPB) during consolidation years 
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of consolidation episodes over 
time 
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The first half of the 1980s, the period after the second oil price shock, hosts more than one fourth 
of the overall number of years of consolidation identified in our sample (see Figure 2). After this 
first major wave, the number of consolidations dropped significantly in the second half of the 
decade in spite of the fact that only a small share of the corrections implemented in the first half 
had turned out to be successful on the basis of our definition.  
Against this backdrop, and also in view of the convergence process towards the common 
currency, which required Member States to bring the deficit and the debt ratio in line with the 
 9
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provisions of the Treaty, fiscal consolidation episodes boomed again in the second half of the 
1990s, this time with greater success. More than half of the years of consolidation gave rise to 
improvements that were at least in part safeguarded in the three years after the end of the period. 
The occurrence of fiscal consolidations remained invariably high in the first six years of the 
2000s, but the success rate dropped significantly. This drop reflects two factors: one formal the 
other more of substance. First, on the basis of our definition success can only be established three 
years after the end of the consolidation period. Hence, the verdict is still out on episodes that 
started in 2004 or later. Second, the first half of the 2000s was characterised by an economic 
slowdown that turned out to be much longer and deeper than expected. In that period, 
consolidation efforts were successively eroded by repeated negative growth surprises. 
3. The determinants of fiscal consolidations 
The aim of this section is twofold: to sheds light on the factors that have an impact on the 
probability to start an episode of fiscal consolidation and to identify the factors that determine the 
type of fiscal adjustment, i.e. 'gradual' versus 'cold shower'. On top of the traditional factors such 
as the macroeconomic and fiscal conditions prevailing ahead of the consolidation episode, we 
also explore the role played by fiscal governance and structural reforms. The conjecture linked to 
both, fiscal governance and structural reforms, is that their occurrence and quality should have a 
positive impact on the probability of triggering a fiscal consolidation.  
The analysis of a broader set of determinants of fiscal consolidation compared to the existing 
literature relies on datasets of which some were made available only recently. This is especially 
the case for indicators of fiscal governance and expenditure reforms. A detailed description of the 
data sets, including coverage of countries and time period is provided in Table A1 in the Annex.  
What triggers fiscal consolidations? 
Table 3 below displays the results of probit regressions. In addition to a baseline specification, 
which includes the initial headline deficit and the  output gap, the probit regressions were ran 
sequentially by adding one by one individual explanatory variables. In the table, the output of the 
estimations is reported by thematic groups of explanatory variables: political factors, fiscal 
governance and structural reforms. (10)  
In line with the findings of previous studies, years of consolidation are preceded by fiscal 
hardship. The estimated coefficient of the headline deficit has the expected positive sign and is 
statistically significant. This means that a fiscal correction becomes more likely as the state of 
public finances deteriorates. The political economy behind this result is intuitive and can be taken 
to reflect the mechanics of a war of attrition. Changes to the prevailing course of fiscal policy are 
 
(10) The approach of running probit regressions sequentially for a baseline specification plus individual explanatory variables is dictated by the 
need to have a well-behaved maximum likelihood solution. 
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procrastinated until there is the necessary awareness, that further delays may be more costly than 
taking correcting measures.  
The results related to initial economic conditions do not match with expectations. A priori and 
based on the findings of previous work, the chances to engage in a fiscal correction should 
actually increase as economic conditions, measured by the output gap, turn soar. Our results 
would seem to support the opposite conclusion; the estimated coefficient of the output gap is 
positive and significant. There are at least two possible explanations for this result. First, the 
fiscal variable included in our baseline specification is expressed in nominal terms. It reflects the 
combination of two factors: the underlying budgetary position and the budgetary impact of the 
cycle. Hence, it may capture both fiscal and economic conditions at the same time. Second, the 
output gap estimates used in the probit regressions are not those available in real time, i.e. those 
available to fiscal authorities at the moment decisions are taken. They represent ex-post estimates 
based on the information on hand in 2007. As shown by Forni and Momigliano (2004) the 
behaviour of fiscal policy making, as measured by the annual changes in the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance, is better explained by the output gap estimates available in real time.  
The conclusions about the role played by the economic environment shift back in line with 
expectations if the economic conditions are proxied by the rate of unemployment. The probability 
to start a fiscal correction increases with the number of employees searching for a job. This 
finding – not reported in Table 3 – is confirmed by a simple mean comparison, which shows that 
years preceding a fiscal consolidation are characterised by a higher rate of unemployment than 
‘normal’ years.The role of political factors in shaping the occurrence of fiscal corrections is 
captured by three variables: parliamentary elections, the strength of the ruling coalition in 
parliament and the Herfindahl index. (11) Our choice of policy variables does not reflect any 
specific apriori. It is dictated by the availability of data for the time and cross section dimension 
of our sample. In theory, the likelihood of fiscal consolidations should increase immediately after 
parliamentary elections, i.e. at the beginning of a new political term, as well as with the strength 
of the political backing of the government in Parliament or the concentration of political power. 
The estimated impact of the election dummy, after controlling for fiscal and cyclical conditions, 
has the expected sign but is not statistical significance at conventional levels. The same holds for 
the size of the ruling collation in Parliament. Somewhat surprising is the result for the variable 
capturing the degree of concentration or fragmentation of political parties. On the face of it, the 
estimate suggests that after controlling for the state of public finances and the economy, the 
likelihood of fiscal correction to occur increases with the number of parties in the political arena. 
We take this result as purely spurious requiring further examination, for instance by taking into 
account interactions with other policy variables. 
An additional set of elements, that may potentially shape fiscal consolidations and that has not 
been studied so far, is fiscal governance. In this paper we focus on two categories: fiscal rules and 
 
(11) The Herfindahl index measures the degree of concentration in Parliament with respect to the number of political parties. It takes a large value 
when the number of parties is low and lower values if the number of parties is high. 
budgetary procedures. In line with Kopits and Symansky (1998), a fiscal rule is defined as a 
permanent constraint in fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt or a major component 
thereof. By budgetary procedures we mean all arrangements related to the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of the annual government budget. A comprehensive database 
covering features of fiscal governance has been built by the Directorate-General for Economic 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission over the past few years. It covers the EU-25 
Member States over the period 1990-2005. The most developed section of the database is on 
fiscal rules. It formed the basis of the analysis presented in European Commission (2006) and in 
Debrun et al. (2008). (12)  
Table 3: Probability of starting a fiscal consolidation 
Probability of starting a fiscal consolidation
Explanatory variables Estimated coefficient z statistic p-value
No. of 
obs.
Initial conditions
Headline deficit (t-1) % of GDP 0.02 3.84 0.00 466
Output gap (t-1) % of GDP 0.01 2.32 0.02 466
Political factors
Elections (t-1), dummy 0.07 1.47 0.14 425
Size of majority in Parliament 0.12 0.45 0.65 427
Party concentration in Parliament (Herfindahl index) -0.39 -2.31 0.02 427
Fiscal governance
Fiscal rules (average), index 0.03 1.58 0.11 230
Expenditure rules (average), index 0.02 1.07 0.28 230
Budgetary procedures, index 0.03 2.09 0.04 213
Structural reforms 
Pensions (RDBF), dummy -0.01 -0.25 0.80 216
Employment protection legislation (RDBF), dummy 0.01 0.30 0.76 216
Unemployment benefits (RDBF), dummy 0.09 2.96 0.03 216
Labour market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.03 0.80 0.42 297
Product market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.06 1.26 0.20 263
Baseline
Notes : See Table A1 in the Annex for detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data, standard errors adjusted for intra-panel 
error correlation. On top of the baseline specification, regressions were run sequentially by adding each individual additional  variable. Estimated coefficients represent 
the marginal contribution of the explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the probabiliy of starting a fiscal consolidation. 
 
The assumption that well-designed fiscal rules and procedures help trigger and carry through 
consolidations in case the fiscal performance deteriorates is supported by the results of probit 
regressions. The likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation increases with the coverage and the 
strength of numerical fiscal rules and with the quality of budgetary procedures. In the case of 
fiscal rules, the statistical significance is relatively weak, but very close to the 10% level. The 
role played by expenditure rules, a specific category of fiscal rules, turns out to be rather 
unimportant. This evidence is consistent with recent findings pointing to less significant 
budgetary impact of expenditure rules compared with budget balance rules (Debrun et al., 2008). 
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(12) The indicators of fiscal rules are relatively complex. They are constructed in such a way as to capture not only the existence of rules, but also 
its strength and the fraction of general government finances covered by the rule. Similarly, the indicators of budgetary procedures encompass 
a number of dimensions such as transparency, level of centralisation and prudence. A brief description of the database and its content is in 
Table A1 in the Annex. 
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Episodes of fiscal consolidation may or may not be coupled to other economic policy measures 
notably structural reforms. A prori there could be trade-offs as well as complementarities. The 
trade-off would reflect the fact that some reforms have a direct budgetary cost. By the same 
token, reforms and consolidation could also be considered to be complementary on the grounds 
that some reforms release weight from the expenditure side of the budget, such as a reform of 
social transfers. A comprehensive discussion of the issue is provided in Deroose and Turrini 
(2005) and European Commission (2005). The analysis is based on indicators for labour and 
product market reforms used in IMF (2004) and pension reform indicators reporting the year of 
adoption and the main characteristics of the reform. At the time, some evidence is found that 
consolidations do not preclude structural reforms. More specifically, structural reforms do not 
happen less frequently in years of fiscal consolidation. 
Less obvious is the role played by structural reforms. As mentioned before, reforms may both 
conflict with and foster fiscal consolidation depending on whether they imply direct budgetary 
costs or savings. Our regression analysis provides some evidence that specific structural reforms 
can indeed increase the probability to begin fiscal adjustment. In particular, the approval by 
Parliament of reforms that reduce the level of unemployment benefits turns out to be an important 
and statistically significant factor for prompting fiscal consolidation. A similar result is obtained 
for the more general indicator of labour market reforms of the IMF (2004). The causality implied 
by these result is not clear cut. It could simply signal that consolidations tend to go along with 
changes in some expenditure categories, in particular unemployment benefits. It could also mean 
that reforms in general are a good predictor of the general willingness of fiscal policy makers to 
bring in order public finances. The evidence for the second conjecture is mixed. The approval of 
reforms that loosen employment protection legislation as measured by the indicators of the 
Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti (FRDB)  have a small positive effect on the kick-off probability 
yet the link is not significant at conventional levels. The same holds for the summary indicators 
of product market reforms constructed by the IMF (2004). 
The estimated impact of pension reforms, as measured by the indicators provided by FRDB, is 
also not statistically significant. The negative sign would tend to suggest, that after controlling for 
the initial level of the headline deficit and for initial cyclical conditions the approval of pension 
reforms tends to diminish the likelihood of fiscal consolidation being started. However, this result 
cannot be attributed to a potentially negative short-term budgetary impact of pension reforms. 
The pension reform indicator used in our regression refers to the approval and not the 
implementation of the reform. Hence, to the extent that the full implementation of reforms takes 
time there should be no conflict between costs of systemic pension reforms and fiscal adjustment 
effort. In addition, most of the pension reforms included in the dataset used for our regressions 
are rather incremental in nature, i.e. they impact on a part of an existing system instead of 
overhauling it completely. The estimated negative impact of pension reforms on the chances to 
start a fiscal consolidation is more likely to reflect political economy elements. In particular, it is 
preferable to stagger major fiscal policy measures rather than to overburden the electorate that 
must support the reforms.  
What explains the difference between 'cold shower' and 'gradual' consolidations? 
In Section 4 below, when discussing the determinants of success, it will be shown that, based on 
our empirical analysis, the type of consolidation, i.e. 'cold shower' versus 'gradual', does not 
significantly affect the probability of success. Nevertheless, separate probit regressions on the 
determinants of gradual adjustments reveal a number of insightful patterns which will be briefly 
discussed in the following paragraphs. The results are reported in Table 4.  
Table 4: Probability of a gradual fiscal consolidation 
Estimated 
coefficient z statistic p-value
No. of 
obs.
Initial conditions
Headline deficit (t-1) % of GDP -0.03 -1.51 0.13 127
Output gap (t-1) % of GDP -0.03 -1.13 0.25 127
Consolidation in three preceding years (dummy) 0.43 4.37 0.00 127
Composition of adjustment (change, % of GDP) 127
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure 0.15 3.69 0.00 127
Expenditure composition of adjustment 
Government wage bill -0.36 -2.45 0.01 127
Government investment expenditure 0.29 2.27 0.02 127
Government final consumption expenditure -0.06 -0.82 0.41 107
Subsidies -0.3 -2.80 0.05 124
Transfers other than in kind -0.21 -1.40 0.16 104
Transfers in kind -0.25 -1.78 0.07 98
Political factors
Elections , dummy 0.04 0.40 0.68 117
Size of majority in Parliament -0.58 -1.38 0.16 116
Party concentration in Parliament (Herfindahl index) -0.22 -0.30 0.76 116
Fiscal governance 
Fiscal rules (time average), index -0.06 -1.35 0.17 63
Expenditure rules (time average), index 0.003 0.06 0.94 63
Budgetary procedures, index -0.005 -0.25 0.80 53
Expenditure reforms 
Expenditure reforms, dummy 0.067 0.76 0.44 105
Baseline 
Explanatory variables
Notes : See Table A1 in the Annex for detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data, standard errors adjusted 
for intra-panel error correlation. On top pf the baseline specification, regressions were run sequentially by adding individually each one of the additional 
variables. Coefficients represent marginal contribution of the explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the probabiliy of enacting a gradual 
rather than a 'cold shower' adjustment. 
 
While the likelihood of engaging in a 'gradual' rather than a 'cold shower' type of adjustment is 
negatively, but not strongly, associated with the size of the initial deficit, it significantly increases 
if the adjustment comes closely after an earlier episode of consolidation, specifically within a 
period of three years. This result is quite intuitive suggesting that in terms of political feasibility 
there is the tendency not to overburden the electorate and the economy with a close sequence of 
large and short-lived episodes of fiscal corrections.  
The probability of a 'gradual' adjustment is also positively, but only weakly, linked to the gravity 
of the initial cyclical conditions, as measured by the output gap in the year preceding the 
correction. The interpretation is that fiscal policy makers are more likely to favour a fiscal 
therapy that spreads out the impact on economic activity so as to make it more palatable to the 
electorate. 
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A third interesting result refers to the composition of the expenditure restraints. Fiscal 
consolidations that rely strongly on a reduction of politically sensitive items such as government 
wages are more likely to be of the gradual type. Fiscal policy makers will generally face the 
resistance of public servants, a relatively homogeneous and generally well organised interest 
group, to abrupt and large reductions in their salary or to a reduction of staff. A similar reasoning 
applies to cuts in subsidies or transfers: large savings in this type of expenditures are more likely 
to be achieved in the context of a 'gradual' fiscal adjustment. (13) 
By contrast, larger cuts in expenditure items that do not relate to well defined constituencies, 
typically investment expenditure, are more likely to be implemented during 'cold shower' 
episodes. The estimated coefficient relating to government investment expenditure in the 
respective probit regression reported in Table 4 has the correct (positive) sign and is highly 
significant. Hence, after controlling for initial conditions and the overall contribution of primary 
expenditure, cutbacks of investment expenditure are more characteristic for short and sharp 
consolidation episodes. 
Among the political factors examined our regression analysis, the size of the majority in 
parliament seems to matter. In line with expectations, a larger majority decreases the likelihood 
of a gradual adjustment as a strong political backing ceteris paribus provides the basis for more 
decisive actions.  
The role of fiscal governance and structural reforms seems to be limited to the start and success 
of fiscal consolidation. The estimated coefficients of expenditure rules and expenditure reforms 
have a positive sign, suggesting a stronger reading of these elements give rise to a more measured 
pace of fiscal consolidation. By contrast, strong fiscal rules and budgetary procedures tend to 
favour sharper and shorter corrections. However, the results for fiscal governance and structural 
reforms are not statistically significant. 
4. Determinants of success 
In our sample, roughly one out of three consolidation episodes turns out to be successful on the 
basis of Definition 2. As in the previous sections we run probit regressions to single out a number 
of success factors. The baseline specification of the probit regressions includes variables gauging 
the initial economic and fiscal conditions as well as the size and the expenditure content of the 
fiscal adjustment. Additional variables are added individually and are arranged in four different 
groups: the composition of the fiscal adjustment, other fiscal factors, political factors, fiscal 
governance and structural reforms. A summary of the estimation results is provided in Table 5.  
 
(13) The political economy dimensions underling these results are well known and have been extensively explored in the literature under the 
heading of vested interests (see for instance Drazen, 2000). Strong policy measures, in our specific case expenditure cuts, that affect well defined 
or powerful constituencies will encounter fiercer opposition as opposed to measures that concern a broader and heterogeneous group.  
 
Initial conditions, size and composition of adjustment 
To start with, the gravity of the initial fiscal conditions measured by the level of the headline 
deficit ratio is a statistically significant determinant of success: the worse the public finance 
situation, the higher the probability of implementing a lasting fiscal correction. The gravity of 
initial conditions seems to heighten the awareness that significant policy measures are required to 
change the status quo.  
Table 5: Probability of successful fiscal consolidation 
Estimated 
coefficient z statistic p-value
No. of 
obs.
Initial conditions
Headline deficit (t-1) % of GDP 0.07 4.03 0.00 113
Output gap (t-1) % of GDP 0.05 1.51 0.13 113
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -0.08 -1.12 0.26 113
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure -0.12 -2.77 0.01 113
Expenditure composition of adjustment
Government wage bill 0.15 0.94 0.34 113
Government investment expenditure 0.38 2.01 0.04 113
Government final consumption -0.08 -0.84 0.40 113
Subsidies -0.02 -0.12 0.90 113
Transfers other than in kind -0.15 -1.05 0.29 94
Transfers in kind 0.09 0.56 0.57 88
Other fiscal factors
Gradual consolidation, dummy -0.14 -0.63 0.53 113
Tax elasticities 0.01 0.54 0.58 87
Political factors
Elections (t-1), dummy 0.13 1.27 0.20 108
Size of majority in Parliament 0.31 0.49 0.62 107
Party concentration in Parliament (Herfindahl index) -1.13 -1.21 0.22 107
Fiscal governance 
Fiscal rules (average), index 0.95 4.45 0.00 52
Expenditure rules (average), index 0.06 0.66 0.50 52
Budgetary procedures, index 0.27 2.55 0.01 44
Structural reforms 
Pensions (RDBF), dummy 0.25 1.36 0.17 54
Employment protection legislation (RDBF), dummy 0.18 1.10 0.20 54
Unemployment benefits (RDBF), dummy 0.38 2.41 0.02 54
Labour market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.57 4.00 0.00 81
Product market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.54 3.02 0.00 74
Expenditure reforms, dummy 0.21 1.33 0.18 96
Notes:  See Table A1 in the annex for a detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data, standard errors adjusted for intra-panel 
error correlation. Starting from the basesline specification additional variables where added individually in turn. Coefficients represent marginal contribution of the 
explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the probabiliy of consolidation being successful. 
Explanatory variables
Size and composition of adjustment (change, % of GDP)
Baseline
 
However, the channel through which the degree of awareness increases the odds for success is 
not necessarily the size of the needed fiscal adjustment. The estimated coefficient of the change 
of the CAPB is not statistically significant and does not have the expected sign. The findings in 
the literature concerning the link between the size of adjustment and the likelihood of success are 
not clear cut. The results would also seem to depend on the specific definition of success used in 
the empirical analysis. (14) 
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(14)    The definition used in our analysis is based on a fixed deterioration of the CAPB compared to the last year of the adjustment. As long as this 
criterion is met there is no difference between very large adjustments and smaller ones. Our definition may even penalise very large 
adjustments which while not meeting the condition of Definition 2 give rise to a larger net improvement of the CAPB. In a number of other 
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What appears to make a clear difference for success is the composition of the fiscal adjustment, 
as measured by the size of the change in cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure. In particular, 
the likelihood of success significantly increases with savings in primary expenditure net of 
cyclical factors.  
The composition of expenditure adjustment  
We augmented the baseline specification in Table 5 with explanatory variables adding 
information on the composition of the expenditure adjustment during consolidation periods.  
A common finding in the literature is that successful consolidations are those that focus on social 
security and, in particular, government wages. Our analysis weakens the conclusion on 
government wages. In our sample, there is no individual item of current primary expenditure that 
stands out as particularly instrumental for the likelihood of success. The typical pattern seems to 
be one of across-the-board savings in current primary expenditures. All components seem to be 
moving into the same direction during episodes of fiscal consolidations with total current 
transfers showing the largest average annual decline followed by non-wage consumption 
expenditure (see Table 5). Hence, the government wage bill does not play a particularly 
prominent role in our EU sample of successful consolidations.  
One likely reason for this result is the selection of countries. Previous studies largely focus 
attention on OECD economies, i.e. including a number of non-EU countries, notably USA, 
Canada and Australia where cuts in government wages during episodes of fiscal consolidation 
may have been particularly important. This is partly confirmed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) 
who provide country-specific information on a number of consolidation episodes in the OECD. 
Other possible explanations for the weak link between cuts in wages and success in our EU 
sample are: (i) wage cuts are likely to be implemented in a gradual way and hence do not produce 
their full effect in three years after the end of the consolidation period; (ii) wage cuts are 
politically costly and are coupled with compensatory measures like tax cuts in the short run. 
The weak link between cuts in the government wage bill and the likelihood of success does not 
necessarily mean that fiscal consolidations in the EU did not fully exploit the potentially 
beneficial effects of wage moderation, including the expansionary effects that wage moderation 
may have on economic growth. There are at least two different channels through which fiscal 
consolidation may foster wage moderation. The first channel consists in constraining the increase 
in government wages directly. To the extent that the government sector acted as the leader in the 
national wage bargaining process, the control of government wages would spill over to the 
economy as a whole and in turn sustain economic activity. In practice, however, there seem to be 
no clear examples of EU countries were the government sector can be taken to set the agenda in 
national wage bargaining.  
studies, on top of a deficit criterion the stabilisation of the debt ratio is used as complementary condition for success. In that case success is 
correlated with the initial debt level; i.e. the larger the fiscal correction the higher the likelihood to stabilise the debt. 
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The indirect and probably equally important channel through which fiscal consolidation impacts 
on wage developments, which in turn contributes to the success of a fiscal correction via stronger 
economic growth, is the one suggested by Alesina and Perotti (1997). In the framework of a 
country's wage setting mechanism wage claims will generally be more moderate if fiscal 
consolidation does not affect after-tax wages in the economy as a whole. This will typically be 
the case for expenditure- as compared to revenue-based fiscal corrections. Hence, the right 
composition of adjustment can induce wage moderation in the economy as a whole, including the 
government sector. Moreover, wage moderation is conducive to sustained economic growth 
which will feed back to the government sector via revenues. (15) 
A second relevant result emerging from our analysis is that strong reliance on cuts in government 
investment expenditure during consolidation periods reduce significantly the chances of carrying 
out a successful adjustment. The most likely explanation is that, while government investment is 
easily cut, it is also easily raised, so that investment expenditure cuts carried out during 
consolidation periods are more likely to be reversed over time compared with other expenditure 
items. 
Political factors 
Of the three political indicators considered in our work, two turn out to have a positive, yet 
statistically not significant, effect on the likelihood for success: the beginning of a political term 
and the size of the majority of the ruling coalition in parliament. While these two factors seem to 
matter less for a consolidation to occur, they tend to augment the odds to achieve a more lasting 
fiscal correction once the decision for a fiscal consolidation is taken. This result comes not as a 
surprise as governments with a strong majority in parliament can be assumed to stand a greater 
chance to implement more effective fiscal corrections. Similarly, 'serious' or politically more 
costly measures can also be expected to be taken shortly after elections rather than towards the 
end of a political terms ahead of elections. 
Fiscal governance and other fiscal factors 
The more interesting and certainly novel finding of our analysis refers to the link between success 
and fiscal governance. Our regression results clearly show that, after controlling for initial 
conditions as well as for the size and the composition of the fiscal adjustment, the presence, 
coverage and strength of numerical fiscal rules and budgetary procedures are conducive to the 
success of consolidation. Somewhat surprisingly the link between success and fiscal governance 
is weak when considering expenditure rules only. The estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant and has the wrong sign. One possible reading of this result could be that expenditure 
rules may impose an excessive focus on expenditure thereby affecting investment expenditure 
which by experience is likely to rebound. By contrast, deficit and debt rules provide leeway to 
 
(15) For a discussion of the link between wages, employment and economic activity see for instance Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and Mourres 
(2004). 
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combine expenditure cuts with some revenue increases. On the other hand, the weaker role of 
expenditure rules in explaining the success of consolidation could simply reflect the fact that in 
practice they are generally limited to central government whereas deficit and debt rules have a 
larger coverage of general government public finances.  
The link between fiscal governance and the success of fiscal adjustment is likely to work via at 
least two different channels. First, comprehensive and strong fiscal rules favour discipline-
oriented budgets. They provide incentives to design adjustment measures that stand a higher 
chance to be effective and lasting, not least in view of the possible costs associated with the risk 
of running afoul of the rules. Second, well designed budgetary procedures favour good planning, 
a balanced composition and an effective implementation of consolidation measures as opposed to 
a situation in which measures are drawn up over a short period of time, in an un-coordinated way 
and potentially based on not very prudent assumptions.  
In addition to the size and the composition of the fiscal adjustment, we have examined two other 
fiscal factors: the type of adjustment and the behaviour of tax elasticities. Whereas there is no 
clear a priori concerning the type of adjustment, the expectations linked to tax elasticities is the 
following. Empirically, the tax elasticity with respect to GDP, i.e. the relative change of total 
current taxes with respect to the relative change of nominal GDP, can be subject to significant 
autonomous fluctuations. Such fluctuations are due to changes in the composition of aggregate 
demand or changes in the primary distribution of income towards more or less tax rich 
components. For instance, private consumption expenditure is markedly more tax rich than 
exports or investment expenditure, and compensations of employees are generally more tax rich 
than gross operating surplus. In case a fiscal consolidation relied on a temporary increase in tax 
elasticities the chances for success should be lower, as revenues would at some point move back 
to 'normal' levels. This conjuncture is only partially confirmed by our regression analysis. The 
estimated coefficient of the variable controlling for autonomous fluctuations in the tax elasticity 
has the expected negative sign, yet is not statistically significant.  
Structural reforms 
The last group of potential determinants of success examined in our regression analysis are 
structural reforms. Ex ante it could be argued that reforms improve the chances of success as they 
should typically result in durable changes in the way public money is spent. For instance, labour 
market reform or pension reforms translating into a reduction of  benefit levels should ceteris 
paribus produce direct and lasting effects on expenditure. In addition, some structural reforms 
can also be expected to have a positive impact on economic growth and hence support the 
success of consolidation via the denominator of the deficit ratio.  
A positive link between the probability of success and certain types of structural reform is 
confirmed for our sample. A first interesting and clear point emerging from the analysis is that 
the likelihood of success is significantly increased when the fiscal consolidation is linked to or 
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falls in years in which labour and/or product market reforms - as measured by the indicators used 
in IMF (2004) - are enacted. 
The RDBF database of structural reforms allows for a further differentiation between two kinds 
of labour market reforms: modifications of the employment protection legislation and of 
unemployment benefits. Both reforms turn out to have a positive impact on the likelihood to 
produce a lasting correction of the underlying fiscal position, yet only the reform of 
unemployment benefits seems to produce a statistically significant effect. The statistically weaker 
effect of changes to the employment protection legislation can be reconciled with labour market 
theory according to which lower protection produces ambiguous effects on unemployment (see 
for instance Jackman, 1990) with no clear repercussions on the budget. 
The positive effect of labour market reforms in our regression results confirm the findings in the 
existing literature about the importance of the labour market channel emphasised by Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) and confirmed by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). Notably, elements that impact on 
the wage formation in the economy as a whole are conducive to successful fiscal consolidation. 
This finding relates to the more general insight according to which wage moderation is beneficial 
for employment creation, overall economic activity and finally fiscal performance: a given level 
of government expenditure is easier to sustain if economic activity increases.  
The final type of reforms explored in our regression analysis are expenditure reforms as defined 
by Hauptmeier et al. (2006) who examine expenditure reforms enacted in 21 OECD countries 
over the period 1960-2007. Depending on the degree of effort, expenditure reforms are divided 
into two categories: 'ambitious' and 'timid' expenditure reforms. Ambitious reforms are identified 
as episodes in which the primary spending ratio is reduced by at least 5% of GDP over a period 
of seven years. Timid reforms are episodes in which the reduction is less than 5% of GDP, again 
over a seven- year period. (16) Although the estimated coefficient for expenditure reforms has the 
expected positive sign statistics fall short of conventional significance levels. 
Is the recipe for successful consolidation changing over time? 
The issue arises to what extent the ‘recipe’ for successful fiscal consolidations emerging from the 
previous analysis depends on the specific sample considered or is valid irrespective of the 
specific time period chosen. To provide an answer to this question, the same analysis shown in 
Table 5 is repeated for a sample starting after 1989.   
Separate probit regressions for this sub-period shows that savings in primary expenditure still 
have a positive impact on the probability of success but the evidence is much weaker (Table 6). 
The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant as compared to the regression for the 
period as a whole. 
 
(16)  Clearly, such definitions are potentially overlapping with our definition of consolidation with one big exception; they refer to expenditures 
only and, hence, depending on what happens on the revenue side may more or less intersect with fiscal consolidation as measured by the 
improvement of the primary budget balance. 
This result is quite important as it points to a possible shift in the recipe for success over time. 
The conventional wisdom about the importance of expenditure-based consolidations seems to 
have lost some of its bearing. One potential explanation could be that there has been a 
convergence in the composition of adjustment. If successful and unsuccessful consolidations 
increasingly relied on a similar mix of expenditure and revenue cuts, composition would no 
longer be a discriminatory element.  
Table 6: Probability of successful fiscal consolidation (from 1990 onward) 
Estimated 
coefficient z statistic p-value
No. of 
obs.
Initial conditions
Headline deficit (t-1) % of GDP 0.08 3.14 0.02 58
Output gap (t-1) % of GDP 0.01 0.52 0.60 58
58
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -0.08 -0.93 0.35 58
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure -0.06 -1.20 0.22 58
Expenditure composition of adjustment
Government wage bill -0.11 -0.55 0.57 58
Government investment expenditure 0.23 1.07 0.28 58
Government final consumption -0.2 -1.93 0.05 57
Subsidies -0.25 -0.94 0.34 58
Transfers other than in kind -0.11 -0.77 0.44 57
Transfers in kind -0.15 -0.51 0.60 53
Other fiscal factors
Gradual consolidation, dummy -0.01 -0.05 0.96 58
Tax elasticities 0.04 1.61 0.11 52
Political factors
Elections (t-1), dummy 0.16 1.14 0.25 58
Size of majority in Parliament 0.012 0.01 0.99 58
Party concentration in Parliament (Herfindahl index) -0.96 -0.91 0.36 58
Fiscal governance 
Fiscal rules (average), index 0.95 4.45 0.00 52
Expenditure rules (average), index 0.06 0.66 0.50 52
Budgetary procedures, index 0.27 2.55 0.01 44
Structural reforms 
Pensions (RDBF), dummy 0.07 0.42 0.67 38
Employment protection legislation (RDBF), dummy 0.01 0.06 0.95 38
Unemployment benefits (RDBF), dummy 0.14 0.92 0.35 38
Labour market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.47 2.21 0.03 31
Product market (IMF, 2004), dummy 0.53 1.55 0.12 31
Expenditure reforms, dummy 0.17 0.64 0.52 41
Notes:  See Table A1 in the annex for a detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data, standard errors adjusted for intra-panel 
error correlation. Starting from the basesline specification additional variables where added individually in turn. Coefficients represent marginal contribution of the 
explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the probabiliy of consolidation being successful. 
Explanatory variables
Size and composition of adjustment (change, % of GDP)
Baseline
 
This conjecture is partially confirmed by the data. As regards cuts in primary expenditure net of 
cyclical factors the difference between successful and unsuccessful consolidations narrowed 
somewhat in the 1990s and beyond. In the latter period, the average annual reduction of 
expenditure net of cyclical factors achieved during years of unsuccessful consolidation almost 
doubled as compared to the entire period, while the overall size of the correction in terms of the 
primary budget balance remained broadly unchanged.  
The shift towards stronger expenditure cuts during unsuccessful episodes was not attained by 
reducing investment expenditure, i.e. the category that is generally thought to be easier to 
restraint in the short term with the risk of bouncing back afterwards. The average annual decline 
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in investment expenditure during consolidation episodes was actually slightly lower in the 1990s 
and beyond. Overall, while narrowing the difference in the composition between successful and 
unsuccessful consolidations remained significant. Consequently, there must have been other 
factors at play affecting the likelihood for success.  
One important element in this context is certainly the experience ahead of the inception of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), when a number of EU Member States made relatively 
large efforts to qualify for the euro. In several cases those efforts involved both a significant 
increase in government revenues and significant savings on the expenditure side. What made the 
difference between success and failure was the ability to safeguard the corrections over time, 
independently of the composition of the adjustment. Structural reforms and numerical fiscal rules 
seem to play an important role in this respect. 
The exceptional circumstances linked to the run-up to the euro also seem to have had an impact 
on the effectiveness of recipes which based on conventional wisdom are generally not crowned 
by success. For instance, consolidation episodes in Italy and Spain in the 1990s are telling 
examples of fiscal corrections that yielded lasting results while following at first glance non-
standard strategies. In the case of Italy, the heavy reliance on higher revenues was accompanied 
by measures aimed at capping existing expenditure trends. Such measures did not translate into 
measurable expenditure savings in percent of GDP but calmed expenditure dynamics. In the case 
of Spain, the sustainability of revenue based consolidations was probably helped by the fact that 
the overall tax burden was comparatively low. A common feature of both cases is that fiscal 
consolidations were accompanied by the strengthening of fiscal governance and the 
implementation of structural reforms. 
5. Why do consolidations fail? 
This section takes a brief look at the consolidation episodes which did not end with success. The 
focus will be on the different budgetary items that rebounded in the three years following the end 
of the consolidation episode leading or contributing to an overall deterioration of the CAPB of 
more than 0.75% of GDP. In case of successive 'cold shower' or 'gradual' consolidations we 
considered the three years following the last episode. The results are summarised in Table 7. 
The messages emerging from this exercise are relatively clear. Unsuccessful episodes of fiscal 
consolidation fail because of two reasons: (i) they do not manage to preserve the sizeable 
increases in government revenues on which the fiscal adjustment was built; and (ii) they do not 
manage to control government expenditure in the first place.  
 
Table 7: Backtracking of unsuccessful consolidation episodes 
Cumulative change of revenue and expenditure items in the three years after
the end of an unsucessful fiscal consolidation
Economic classification
Cumulative change in 
% of GDP
Number of 
observations
Total revenue -0.46 34
Total expenditure 1.71 34
Revenue cyclically adjusted -0.59 33
Primary expenditure cyclically adjusted 1.92 33
Final consumption 0.35 29
Wages 0.19 34
Subsidies 0.00 34
Transfers other than in kind 0.69 29
Transfers in kind 0.35 28
Investment expenditure 0.17 34
Classification of function of government
General public service -0.60 10
Defence -0.18 10
Public order and safety -0.11 10
Economic affairs -0.14 10
Housing -0.13 10
Health 0.38 10
Education -0.04 10
Social protection 0.18 10
Source : Commission Services  
In the three years following an unsuccessful consolidation episode, revenues net of cyclical 
factors decline on average by 0.6 % of GDP in cumulative terms, eroding almost half of the 
increase attained during the consolidation phase. However, what weighs more are expenditure 
dynamics. Adjusted for the cycle, primary expenditures increase on average by close to 2% of 
GDP in the three years following the end of the adjustment. This drift is not due to one specific 
expenditure item; it rather reflects a general problem in controlling expenditures as a whole. In 
relative terms the strongest slippages concern social transfers other than in kind (i.e. mostly 
pensions) and non-wage government consumption. 
Overall, this is a rather clear indication that consolidation measures did not attempt to tackle 
existing expenditure trends, which continue irrespective of the sizable increase in revenues. As 
time goes on the revenue hikes tend to be reversed or turn out to be short-lived unveiling again 
the underlying need to restrain expenditure.  
Additional insight into the 'anatomy of failure' can be gained by analysing the expenditure 
dynamics in terms of the Classification by Function of Government (COFOG classification). This 
shortens considerably the sample to 1995-2006 but still provides some useful information. As 
indicated in the lower part of Table 7, there are essentially two expenditure categories that 
rebound in the aftermath of unsuccessful fiscal adjustments, namely health and social protection. 
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Incidentally, these two COFOG headings include the expenditure items which will principally 
bear or do already bear the budgetary impact of ageing population. A better control of them will 
be increasingly important in the future. Alternatively, a better control or restraint of expenditure 
of other functions of government is required to compensate for the increasing weight of social 
protection and health. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Our empirical analysis of successful fiscal consolidations in the EU highlights a number of 
important lessons. Some match up with the findings in the existing literature; others are new or 
somewhat different from 'conventional wisdom'.  
The lessons consistent with previous findings refer to the initial conditions under which 
successful consolidations are generally started as well as to the overall composition of the fiscal 
correction as such. In particular, the likelihood of success increases if initial fiscal conditions are 
difficult.  
As regards the composition of successful fiscal consolidation, the EU experience confirms that 
cuts in current primary expenditure are more likely to produce a lasting effect than higher 
revenues or large cuts in government investment. However, the validity of this by now familiar 
notion is somewhat weakened for consolidations enacted since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
composition of adjustment per se seems to have lost some of its weight in securing the success. 
A number of factors may explain this finding. Firstly, starting from a relatively large size of 
government in the 1980s, many EU Member States have embarked on a path that has measurably 
reduced the weight of the public sector in the economy. Along this path the leeway for further 
expenditure cuts is gradually reduced unless they are embedded in a structural overhaul of 
specific functions of government. 
Secondly, and possibly linked to the first point, in the 1990s and beyond there was a general 
increase in the expenditure content of fiscal consolidation also among unsuccessful episodes. 
While successful episodes continued to rely significantly more on expenditure restraints the 
difference compared with unsuccessful corrections narrowed to some extent and hence lost some 
of its discriminatory power.  
Thirdly, the motivation to participate in the common currency induced Member States to 
implement sizeable consolidation packages that did not necessarily follow the conventional 
recipe for success. Cuts in primary expenditure still played a role but were complemented by 
additional elements that improved the sustainability of fiscal corrections. Improvements in fiscal 
governance and structural reforms are prominent examples of such additional factors. 
On the basis of our empirical analysis, the quality of fiscal governance turns out to be conducive 
to the success of fiscal consolidation. After controlling for initial conditions and the composition 
of adjustment, the probability to produce a lasting correction is increased when public finances 
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are covered by numerical fiscal rules and/or effective budgetary procedures. The link between the 
quality of fiscal governance and the odds for success of fiscal consolidation is likely to be 
complex and needs to be examined in more detail. The main point is certainly that effective fiscal 
governance fosters discipline-oriented budgets and an effective implementation of budgetary 
plans including fiscal corrections.  
The chances of achieving a lasting fiscal correction also increase significantly if consolidation 
efforts are coupled with structural reforms. This result points to potential complementarities 
between the Stability and Growth Pact and the Strategy for Growth and Jobs. Apart from pension 
reforms, for which the statistical evidence is weak, reforms that aim at improving the functioning 
of labour and product markets turn out to be conducive to success. The channels through which 
structural reforms help fiscal consolidation are twofold: directly by capping or flattening existing 
expenditure trends and indirectly by spurring economic activity. 
A second notable qualification of received wisdom emerging from our analysis relates to the 
more detailed composition of expenditure cuts. According to the prevailing view significant cuts 
in the government wage bill are taken to be an important ingredient to the recipe of success, also 
because they are thought to contribute to wage moderation, which in turn is expected to trigger 
non-Keynesian effects by promoting investment and economic activity. Our analysis indicates 
that in the EU direct cuts in government wages or employment play a comparatively minor role 
in explaining the success of fiscal consolidation. The main contributors to savings in primary 
expenditure of successful consolidations are transfers and non-wage government consumption.  
This conclusion does not diminish the importance of wage moderation as such. While further 
work is needed to explore in detail the precise link between the determinants of successful fiscal 
consolidation and wage developments our analysis supports the conclusion that wage moderation 
in the economy as a whole is conducive to success.  
On the whole, the established recipe for success characterised by significant cuts in primary 
government expenditure is not outdated. It was effective in the 1970s and 1980s and was still 
used in the 1990s. On top of it, the menu of options has widened. Especially in the 1990s, the 
composition of adjustment in terms of primary expenditure cuts lost some of their discriminatory 
power between success and failure. Successful consolidation still remained more expenditure and 
less revenue-based than unsuccessful episodes. However, the differences narrowed. As a result, 
other factors have become more decisive such as fiscal governance and structural reforms. They 
turn out to be instrumental in safeguarding the fiscal correction over time. 
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Annex 
Table A1: Indicators for the determinates of fiscal consolidation 
  
  
Source Description of data from which indicators have 
been constructed 
Country 
coverage 
Year 
coverage  
Indicator 
Fiscal 
governance 
Fiscal rule 
coverage and 
strength 
Commission 
services 
Time-varying index, constructed by combining the 
information contained in the 'fiscal rule coverage 
index' and the information contained in 'the fiscal 
rule strength index'. For details see European 
Commission (2006). 
EU-25 1990-2005 The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
  
Fiscal rule 
coverage 
Commission 
services 
Index summarising, for each Member State, the 
information on what part of general government 
finances is covered by numerical rules (measured 
as the share of government expenditure of the 
general government sub-sector to which the rule 
applies in total general government expenditure). 
All numerical rules are aggregated, in case of 
overlap different weights are applied. The index 
hence may exceed 1.  
EU-25 1990-2005 The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
 
Fiscal rule 
strength  
Commission 
services 
Index, calculated taking into account five criteria: 
the statutory base of the rule; whether there is an 
independent monitoring of the rule; the nature of 
the institution responsible for the enforcement of 
the rule; the existence of pre-defined enforcement 
mechanisms; and the media visibility of the rule. 
The methodology followed was inspired by the 
previous work by Deroose, Moulin and Wierts 
(2005). 
EU-25 1990-2005 The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
  
Expenditure 
rule 
coverage/ 
strength 
Commission 
services 
Index, constructed following exactly the same 
methodology (but restricting the sample to 
numerical expenditure rules), measuring the share 
of government finances covered by expenditure 
rules. 
EU-25 1990-2005 The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
 
Budgetary 
procedures  
Commission 
services 
Index capturing features national budget 
procedures. It covers6 dimensions: transparency, 
multi-annual planning horizon, centralisation of the 
budget process, top-down budgeting, prudent 
economic assumptions and performance budgeting. 
The technical details are explained in section II.3 
of this publication.  Data source: OECD/World 
Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database 
(2003) 
18 EU 
Member 
States 
2003 The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
Structural 
reforms 
Expenditure 
reform  
Hauptmeier 
et al. (2006) 
The index consists in the average annual reduction 
in primary expenditure over a period of 7 years, 
starting in the peak year with the highest primary 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Original Data Source:  
Commission services 
25 
Industr. 
countries 
1981-2004 If the index is 
larger than 5%, 
the expenditure 
reform is 
ambitious, if it is 
between 0 and 
5%, it is timid. 
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Table A1 (continued): Indicators for the determinates of fiscal consolidation 
  
  
Source Description of data from which indicators have 
been constructed 
Country 
coverage 
Year 
coverage  
Indicator 
 
Labour 
market 
reform 
IMF Labour market index consisting of the unweighted 
average of indicators of employment restriction, 
unemployment benefit replacement rate and benefit 
duration. The index is normalized in such a way to 
be between 0 and 1 and to increase as labour 
market restrictions are reduced. Original data 
source: Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Labour 
Market Institutions Database and data used in 
OECD (2003), World Economic Outlook, April, 
Ch. IV. 
EU-14 
except 
Greece 
1970-
1998*  
The yearly change 
in the labour 
market index is 
positive and 
larger than the 
median positive 
change. 
  
Product 
market 
reform 
IMF (2004) Index measuring entry barriers, public ownership, 
market structure, vertical integration and price 
controls in public utilities and transport services. 
The index is normalized in such a way to be 
between 0 and 1 and to increase as product market 
restrictions are reduced. Original data source: 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). 
EU-14 
except 
Greece 
1975-1998 The yearly change 
in the product 
market index is 
positive and 
larger than the 
median positive 
change. 
  
Pension 
reforms 
Rodolfo de 
Benedetti 
Foundation 
(RDBF) 
Data indicating the years in which reforms in 
pension systems were implemented and the major 
characteristics of reforms. 
EU-14 1985-2001 A pension reform 
making the 
system less 
generous took 
place in the year. 
The size of the 
index is larger 
than the median. 
       
 
